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This study finds that Chinese foreign aid has a marginal negative, if at all, impact on human 
rights in Africa.  The study begins with an introduction on Sino-African relations and possible 
implications of these relations.  It then presents a literature review on relevant foreign aid and 
human rights studies.  It moves on to explain the methodology and datasets used before 
presenting and analyzing the results.  The study concludes with ideas for further research 
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1.0  INTRODUCTION 
In May of 1996, China’s President Jiang Zemin paid a state visit to six African countries: Kenya, 
Ethiopia, Egypt, Mali, Namibia, and Zimbabwei
David Sweig and Bi Jianhai argue that China’s new foreign policy was fueled by a need 
for resources such as oil and natural gas
.  This marked the beginning of China’s renewed 
interest in the African continent.  Scholars have presented a number of theories for this renewed 
interest. 
ii.  Yong Deng, on the other hand, argues that the new 
direction was due to China’s struggle for status in the worldiii.  Both R.J. Payne and Matthew 
Garner believe it was a consequence of the One China policy and African-Taiwan relationsiv.  
However, as Wei Liang suggests, it was most likely a mixture of all of thesev
While Europe and the US continued to marginalize Africa’s place in the world in the late 
1990’s and early twenty first century, China embraced the continent as its developing brother.  
Chinese officials declared relations between Africa and China to be a partnership among 
equals.
.  One thing is clear.  
No matter what the reason, China’s foreign policy has changed and it has gained the attention, 
and often concerns, of the Western world.  
vi  This was a distinct difference between Chinese and Western policy.  Western policy 
continues to treat Africa as a region to be monitored and regulated today.  This is particularly 
clear when it comes to instances of foreign aid allocations to Africa. 
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While the West attaches guidelines and restrictions to its foreign aid allocations, China 
has adopted a ‘no-strings attached’ policy.  China’s foreign policy stresses a strict position of 
noninterference when it comes to other nations’ sovereignty.  This leads them to allocate foreign 
aid freely, regardless of political or economic policy factors.  This is the source of many Western 
concerns about Chinese aid and tradevii
The World Bank and the IMF both require political and economic policy changes in 
exchange for foreign aid loans and grants.  These changes include market liberalization and a 
movement towards some kind of representative political system.  Bilateral allocations between 
Western countries and Africa have similar requirements.  In fact, foreign aid is often a tool used 
by Western countries to regulate the corruption found in a number of African governments.
. 
viii
In the past twenty years, Africa has been the setting for several cases of egregious human 
rights violations, such as the genocide in Rwanda or Sudan.  Western aid organizations such as 
USAID claim to use foreign aid as a means to entice these governments to change.  If the corrupt 
government stops infringing upon its citizens’ rights and moves towards democracy, then it will 
receive aid.  If the government does not, then it won’t.
 
ix
Whether or not this is truly how bilateral aid is allocated is arguable, considering US 
security risks have led the country to allocate aid in the Middle East to totalitarian governments 
with highly questionable human rights records because of the War on Terror. However, Chinese 
activity in Africa has risen enough to start worrying the Western countries about the impact this 
activity could be having on democracy and human rights in the region.
   
x
This no strings attached policy allows any African government to receive financial aid 
packages regardless of its internal affairs and policies.  The West claims that this will make 
Africa an even more unstable and corrupt region.  But does Chinese foreign aid really have any 
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impact on human rights violations in Africa?  And if it does, is that impact necessarily negative?  
That is what this paper seeks to discover.  This is a very important issue to consider because the 
answer to this question could influence what actions Western nations and international 
organizations choose to take with regard to China’s increased levels of activity in Africa. 
1.1 LITERATURE REVIEW 
Little to no research has been done on Chinese foreign aid.  The Chinese government has refused 
to publish its foreign aid figures until quite recently.  I only found one other study that attempted 
to examine foreign aid, done by Matthew Garner in 2007xi
This was possible for a Chinese foreign aid study because nearly every aid package was 
allocated during a Chinese state visit to Africa.  Garner was searching to see if Chinese foreign 
aid to Africa corresponded with Chinese national security interests.  He found that sometimes the 
aid packages corresponded and sometimes they did not.  Although he mentions Western 
concerns with China’s ‘no strings attached’ policy, he does not include human rights in his study.  
Also, he had no need to lag his foreign aid data, as he was concerned with the decision to 
allocate the funding rather than the impact that funding may have had in Africa 
.  Since there were no official figures 
published, Garner collected the data himself, searching through 11 years of newspaper articles 
and compiling his own data set.   
This was the only Chinese foreign aid study I came upon in my research.  To help form 
my own study, I looked into more general foreign aid studies.  I searched particularly for studies 
concerning the effectiveness of foreign aid and what impacts scholars believe this aid has on 
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recipient nations.  I also looked into various human rights studies, concentrating mainly on what 
these studies considered were the main impacts on human rights and human rights violations. 
1.1.1 The Effectiveness of Foreign Aid: 
The question of effectiveness has been a controversial aspect of foreign aid studies for years.  A 
large number of these studies have focused on the economic aspects of foreign aid, growth in 
particular.  William Easterly argues in his paper “Can Foreign Aid Buy Growth?” that foreign 
aid does very little to promote economic growth in impoverished nationsxii.  Graham and 
O’Hanlon’s article, “Making Aid Work”, supports this view, advising countries and international 
organizations to withdraw aid, rather than increase itxiii
On the other hand, Dalgaard, Hansen, and Tarp found in their article “On the Empirics of 
Foreign Aid” that in many cases foreign aid has a positive impact on productivity
.   
xiv.  Burnside 
and Dollar also found that foreign aid had a positive impact on growth.  However, they found 
that this was conditional upon whether or not the country practiced good economic and political 
policiesxv
A number of other scholars focused on foreign aid’s impact on poverty and corruption.  
Mosley, Hudson, and Verschoor’s article “Aid, Poverty Reduction, and the New Conditionality” 
tested the effect foreign aid had on poverty reduction.  They found that corruption, inequality, 
and the composition of public expenditure were strongly correlated with aid effectiveness on 
poverty reduction
.   
xvi.  Mwenda and Tangri supported these findings in their article “Politics, 
Donors, and the Ineffectiveness of Anti-corruption Institutions in Uganda”, which insists that 
foreign aid allowed corrupt African governments to stay in power and continue to harm the 
African people.xvii   
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Finally, some foreign aid scholars chose to focus on the effect foreign aid had on 
democracy.  I found these articles to be the most relevant for my own research, as democracy is 
most frequently calculated by human rights databases from ratings on political freedoms and 
civil liberties.  
Arthur Goldsmith utilized Freedom House’s database in his study “Foreign Aid and 
Statehood in Africa”, labeling the countries in Africa either free, partly free, or not freexviii.  
Goldsmith then did a cross-sectional time series analysis on African countries movement 
towards democracy and their received foreign aid.  Goldsmith lagged foreign aid for one year 
and five years, finding that the five-year lag provided a slightly stronger regression.  He also 
looked into variables such as whether or not a state was aid dependent.  He found that there was 
only a small causal effect between aid and democracy liberalization, which was not very 
promising for my own research.     
Freedom House compiles these rankings annually by looking into each country’s political rights.  
Goldsmith then looked at the countries’ movements over time.  If a country moved up to partly 
free or free, it had become more democratic.   
However, Thad Dunning then expanded on Goldsmith’s study in his own article, 
“Conditioning the Effects of Aid: Cold War Politics, Donor Credibility, and Democracy in 
Africa”, splitting the data into two time periods: before and after the end of the Cold War.xix  He 
found that in the first period (during the Cold War), aid had no statistically significant impact on 
democracy.  In the second period, however, aid had a positive impact on democracy and it was 
found to be statistically significant.  These are the only foreign aid studies I have found that 
utilized a human rights database (Freedom House).  However, both used the data to look at the 
impact foreign aid had on democracy, not on human rights violations.  
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Stephen Knack presented a similar study in his article “Does Foreign Aid Promote 
Democracy”.xx
My study will be different from all three of these.  First of all, I will be looking at only 
Chinese foreign aid, in order to see if the western claims have any credence to them.  Also, I will 
be focusing solely on Africa, which while Goldsmith and Dunning focused on Africa, Knack 
included all foreign aid recipients.  I chose to focus on Africa because of China’s increased 
presence there and because of Africa’s history of human rights abuses.  Instead of using the 
democracy ratings from Freedom House, I compiled a human rights rating using the CIRI human 
rights database. 
  Like the previous two, Knack utilized Freedom House’s democracy ratings.  
Instead of using a year lag for control, as Goldsmith and Dunning had done, Knack used the 
mean foreign aid amounts.  He concluded in his study that while democracy ratings had indeed 
increased as a whole over time, little of this could be attributed to foreign aid.  He focused on all 
countries receiving official development assistance, though, rather than solely on Africa as I 
have.   
1.1.2 Human Rights Studies 
Many quantitative human rights studies have focused on determining the cause of gross human 
rights abuses still present in the world today.  While none of these studies used foreign aid as an 
explanatory variable, I still found them useful for my own research in developing a model 
explaining human rights abuses in Africa.   Han S. Park’s study “Correlates of Human Rights: 
Global Tendencies” tested variables he considered likely to be associated with human rights 
abuses.xxi  The main variables tested included ethnic diversity, percentage of Christian 
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population, percentage of Islam population, proportion of population living in cities, welfare 
expenditure, education expenditure, and military expenditure.   
To measure human rights he used Freedom House’s Civil Political Liberty Index, which 
measured political rights and civil liberties, and Freedom House’s Physical Quality of Life 
Index, which measured infant mortality, life expectancy, and literacy rate.  He also used the 
GINI index, which measured income distribution. He ran a correlation matrix with all of the 
variables and found that the Physical Quality of Life index had the strongest associations, which 
included welfare spending, percentage of Christian population, ethnic diversity, and 
urbanization. 
Poe, Tate, and Keith built on an earlier model of theirs in their study “Repression of the 
Human Rights to Personal Integrity Revisited”.xxii
Poe, Tate, and Keith extended their time span for this study, encompassing the years from 
1976-1993.  They found that military regimes lead to greater human rights abuse, while countries 
with a British colonial past had relatively fewer abuses.  The results suggest that leftist countries 
are less repressive than non-leftist countries.  Also, similar to a previous study of theirs, they 
  Unlike Park, they focused solely on personal 
integrity rights.  Also unlike Park, they were looking for predictors of human rights abuses, not 
just associations.  They chose to test the variables democracy, population size, population 
change, economic standing, economic growth, leftist government, military control, British 
colonial influence, international war, and civil war.  They also included a lagged dependent 
variable to control for autocorrelation.  For human rights abuses they used Amnesty 
International’s and the US State Departments yearly reports, looking specifically at political 
imprisonment, execution, disappearances, and torture, coding countries 1-5 (1=low number of 
human rights abuses). 
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found that past levels of repression, democracy, economic development, population size, and 
civil and international war were statistically significant predictors of the level of human rights 
abuse for any given country. 
Eric Neumayer utilized a very similar structure for his study “Do International Human 
Rights Treaties Improve Respect for Human Rights”.xxiii   
For the explanatory variables, Neumayer included his main variable of when a country 
ratifies a human rights treaty.  For controls, he also included democracy, internal and external 
armed conflict, per capita income, population size, and number of NGOs with domestic 
participation.  Neumayer formed a model based on these variables, then performed a multiple 
regression.  He found that treaty ratification actually had very little impact on human rights.  
Democracy and the number of NGOs are far more likely to be responsible for improved human 
rights. 
He used the same coding as Poe, Tate, 
and Keith for measuring level of political integrity, utilizing Amnesty International and State 
Department figures.  He then used Freedom House’s civil rights rating.  He also chose to add a 
lagged dependent variable of two years.   
 Finally, like the studies above, Mitchell and McCormick’s study “Economic and Political 
Explanations of Human Rights Violations” also examined predictors for human rights abuses.xxiv  
As the title suggests, they focused on political and economic explanations, testing variables from 
both.  For economic, they look at poverty, levels of development, and dependence.  For political, 
they look at colonial experience, newness of state, and type of regime.  They found that richer 
and more developed countries tended to have slightly better human rights records.  Ties to 
capitalist states had no impact. The found that countries with a British colonial past were had 
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relatively better records than the other countries.  Newness of the state had no impact. Results 
concerning totalitarian and authoritarian regimes were inconclusive. 
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2.0  RESEARCH 
Research question:
 To my best knowledge, as I have shown in my literature review, this question has not 
been tested.  Very little has been researched about Chinese foreign aid, and it has never been 
used to analyze human rights.  This question is both important and significant because China has 
become a major player in world politics today, and questions have been raised as to the impact 
this growing influence has had and will have on the global level.   
 Does Chinese foreign aid impact human rights violations in Africa? 
 
 
2.1 HYPOTHESIS 
There has been a significant increase of Chinese foreign aid going into Africa in the last decade.  
Chinese foreign aid differs from Western aid. Western foreign aid usually comes with certain 
expectations attached, particularly aid coming from organizations such as the IMF.  These 
expectations place restrictions and guidelines on the aid, giving clear parameters for how it may 
be used.  China, however, employs a ‘no strings attached’ method, because of a strong respect 
for each individual country’s sovereignty.  This ‘no strings attached’ method should have a 
negative impact on human rights for the following reasons. 
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First, three things must be understood.  Number one: It is the government’s job to protect 
and provide for its people.  Number two: The people expect the government to fulfill its duty.  
Number three: There is an inequality of resources in every country.   
In developed nations, even though there is a clear inequality present, the poorest citizens 
of these countries are still relatively well off.  One could redistribute the wealth in these 
countries, and everyone would be able to live reasonably well.  The citizens in these countries 
see their government as fulfilling its duty.  They don’t push for a new government, preferring to 
stick with the status quo.  These countries are rarely recipients of foreign aid, having no need for 
it. 
However, this is not the case for developing nations, which make up most of the world.  
In these countries, an equal division of goods would condemn all to a life of poverty.  It is 
important to remember that the actors in governments are first and foremost individuals, seeing 
to their own interests before the interests of the citizens under their protection.  Economides, 
Kalyvitis, and Philippopoulos showed in their study “Does Foreign Aid Distort Incentives and 
Human Growth?” that as foreign aid increases, rent-seeking activities increase as well.xxv
While western restrictions work to counterbalance these activities, Chinese aid is 
allocated with no attached provisions.  So, when China sends foreign aid to Africa (Africa is a 
continent consisting of mainly developing nations), a place where even the government actors 
are having trouble making ends meet, then the aid is distributed to the government elite first.  
And these government actors don’t just want to get by.  They want to live well.  Why else would 
they have taken on the huge responsibility of running a state, if they were unable to reap from the 
benefits?  This comes at the expense of the rest of the country’s citizens.   
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This aid causes the gap between the poor and rich to grow.  The government is not 
fulfilling its duty to the people, the duty which the people expect their government to fulfill.  
This causes the people to speak out against the government and the actors within the 
government.  This causes them to call for change.  In some cases they demand only a part of the 
aid coming into the country.  However, if the government actors give the people a part of this 
aid, basically giving away their benefits, then the actors have no reason to continue administering 
the state. Sometimes the people even call for a change in administration or in government 
structure entirely, which takes any benefits the government actors might gain away entirely.  
Either way, the government actors face losses.  
 At this point, the government actors need a way to keep these unhappy citizens from 
jeopardizing their control of the state and reception of the aid.  This leads to political repression, 
or in particular, to disappearances, extrajudicial killings, political imprisonments, and the torture 
of the citizens speaking out against the government. It also leads to the repression of 
empowerment rights such as the freedoms of speech, movement, religion, and political 
autonomy.   
No matter how much Chinese foreign aid were to increase in the next years, it is highly 
unlikely that it would ever be enough to correct this inequality of resources for even one country, 
let alone an entire continent.  It is equally unlikely that this aid would push these countries into 
the ‘developed’ category and raise the relative standard of living enough so that the citizens 
would no longer feel the need to object.  Therefore, with an increase in Chinese foreign aid to 
Africa, one would expect to see an increase in human rights violations committed by the 
government against its people. 
Hypothesis: Chinese Foreign Aid will have a negative impact on human rights in Africa 
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In order to test this theoretical causation, I would need access to the GINI coefficient 
data, which is very hard to come by.  GINI tests income inequality within a nation, or the rich 
poor gap.  If I had access to this data, I would first run a regression on Chinese foreign aid and 
the GINI coefficients for the African countries in my study.  Provided this gave the expected 
results (of foreign aid having a positive impact on poverty inequality), I would then run a 
regression of the GINI data and the human rights data, to show that there is a clear relationship 
between those factors as well.  As inequality grows, respect for human rights should fall.   
 Given that this data is currently unavailable to me, I am unable to do this part of the study 
and must assume that the theory is sound.  I do not feel the need to retest whether rent-takers 
activities increase with foreign aid, as Economides, Kalyvitis, and Philippopoulos have already 
done this.  They used the IRIS dataset, which includes indicators for governance, corruption, and 
violation of property rights.xxvi
2.2 METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
 
For this research study I chose to conduct a quantitative descriptive analysis.  I chose to pursue a 
quantitative study rather than a qualitative study because I feel as if to conduct a truly complete 
qualitative analysis I would need to travel to Africa and conduct interviews and surveys myself.  
This option was unavailable to me.  Also, considering how sensitive an issue human rights can 
be with China, I am attempting to present an unbiased objective analysis.xxvii  
I felt as if the best way to do this was quantitatively.  It is efficient and I am able to test a 
clear hypothesis.  I realize that by doing this I may miss some contextual detail.  The ideal study 
would include both quantitative and qualitative analysis, but I did not have the time or the 
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resources to pursue both.  For this same reason I chose to conduct a descriptive analysis, using 
data already available to test my hypothesis rather than gathering it myself.   
 After reading several foreign aid and human rights studies, I chose to utilize the method 
most frequently used by them and set up a multiple regression model.  I used similar control 
variables and attempted to make my model as complete as possible in my allotted time frame.  
This involved testing each variable on its own, first, then combining the variables with the 
largest impact on human rights into a multiple regression model and then adding the foreign aid 
variable.  I explain my choices of variables and my reason for choosing them below.  Then I 
performed the multiple regression and analyzed my results.  Finally, I looked into four specific 
examples, which support my findings. 
2.2.1 Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable in this study is human rights.  Unlike many of the studies I have read, 
which used either Freedom House or Amnesty International data, I chose to use the Cingranelli-
Richards (CIRI) database.  I chose this mainly because with this database the researcher is able 
to access the entire dataset, including individual components.  The database provides 
descriptions for each component, and the coding is explained clearly.  The CIRI dataset contains 
quantitative data on government human rights records from 1981 to 2007.xxviii 
For this study, I am testing the impact foreign aid has on physical integrity rights and 
empowerment rights.  Physical integrity rights include freedom from disappearances, 
extrajudicial killing, political imprisonment, and torture.  Disappearance refers to when people 
have disappeared, political motivation seems likely, and the people have not been found.   
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Extrajudicial killing refers to killings done by government officials without due process.  
Political imprisonment refers to the imprisonment of people by government officials because of 
one of five things: their speech, their membership in a group, their non-violent opposition to 
government, their religious beliefs, or their nonviolent religious practices (which includes 
proselytizing).  This coding index ranges from 0 (absolutely no government respect for the 
rights) to 8 (full government respect for rights).   Empowerment rights include freedoms of 
movement, speech, workers rights, political participation, and religious freedom.  Movement 
refers to a citizens’ freedom to move within their own country, as well as their ability to leave 
and return to said country.  Speech refers to how affected speech or press is by government 
censorship.  Political participation refers to the extent that citizens have political choice and the 
ability to change both laws and officials that government them through free and fair elections.  
 Religion refers to the extent to which the government restricts citizens from practicing 
their religious beliefs.  The empowerment rights index ranges from 0 (absolutely no government 
respect for rights) to 10 (full government respect for rights).  I would have also liked to test 
socio-economic rights, but the CIRI dataset did not have that index and it would have taken more 
time (and possibly could have thrown the results off by using a different system of coding).  I 
will perhaps examine socio-economic rights at a later date. 
For my regression model I will combine the empowerment index and the physical 
integrity index, creating a human rights indicator ranging from 0 (absolutely no government 
respect for rights) to 18 (full government respect for rights).  I expect that as Chinese foreign aid 
increases to any given country in any given year, this human rights index will drop, creating an 
inverse relationship between the two factors.  I will be looking at the years 1998 to 2007.  
Human rights data has not yet become available for 2008. 
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2.2.2 Explanatory Variable 
The main explanatory variable in this study is Chinese foreign aid. The largest obstacle in my 
study was finding this data.  Data on Chinese foreign aid is hard to come by. Most foreign aid 
studies use statistics from the World Bank or the IMF.  However, the Chinese have only recently 
begun to release these statistics.  So, unable to follow the same methodology as previous studies, 
I searched for any other studies that involved Chinese foreign aid.   
I came across Matthew Garner’s study. Garner ran into the same problem I did, finding 
no prepared data to use in order to test his hypothesis on Chinese security interests.  He chose to 
compile the data for himself, going through 11 years of newspaper articles and determining 
foreign aid allocations from announcements made during Chinese official state visits.  I 
examined his methodology, and it seemed to be well designed and thorough.xxix
I decided to utilize this data to test my own hypothesis.  Garner began his dataset in 1995.  
This was a year before the Chinese president’s visit to Africa.  I also went with this date for two 
reasons.  First of all, I believe the visit to Africa marks the point of renewed interest in the 
continent.  Secondly, I wanted to get as many possible cases in order to test my hypothesis.  I 
used the data through 2004. 
   
I also chose to include a lagged variable on the foreign aid for two reasons.  First of all, it 
helps to control autocorrelation.  Secondly, it allows the funding time to actually have an impact 
on the dependent variable.  Most foreign aid studies that I have read included a five-year control 
variable, such as Goldsmith’s study.xxx  I did not want to do this, as it would limit the number of 
cases in my study.  However, the same studies showed that a one year and two year lag wasn’t 
quite enough.  This is what led me to include a three-year lag.  The lag loses only a year’s worth 
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of cases and hopefully includes enough time to both control for autocorrelation and allow the aid 
money to take effect. 
 I used one other control variable with the foreign aid data.  I included all cases of 
countries that do not receive Chinese foreign aid.  Garner did not include these countries in his 
study, but I believe that they provide a necessary control.  Mainly theses control variables are 
nations that recognized Taiwan as an independent nation up to 2004, when unlagged data ends.  
This helped to ensure that any impact on human rights was indeed due to Chinese foreign aid 
increases. 
2.2.3 Constructing the Model 
Once I had determined the data for my main dependent variable and main explanatory variable, it 
was time to construct my model.  Besides the controls I placed on foreign aid, I also worked to 
control for other factors which could impact human rights.  I read through several human rights 
studies and examined the explanatory variables they used and their results.  Nearly all of them 
found that democracy had a strong positive association with human rights and could be counted 
on as a reasonable predictor.  For this reason I chose to include a democracy rating in my study.   
Unlike Goldsmith or Dunning (both of whom used Freedom House’s ratings), I chose to 
use the Polity IV democracy rating.  I made this decision because Polity’s democracy rating does 
not include civil liberties.  This is important in order to avoid an automatic correlation from 
appearing, since I am using civil liberties in my human rights coding.  Polity IV’s democracy 
index looks at two main things: the presence of institutions that citizens can utilize and the 
existence of institutional constraints on executive power.  It is an 11-point index, which ranges 
from 0 (absolutely non-democratic) to 10 (fully democratic).xxxi 
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Several of these human rights studies also included a past colonization aspect to their 
models.  Poe, Tate, and Keith found that countries with a British colonial past were less likely to 
commit human rights violations than those with a different colonial past.xxxii
xxxiii
xxxiv
  Mitchell and 
McCormick found similar results.   I decided to add this variable to my model as well.  I used 
the Oxford Atlas of the World  to determine past colonization experience and double-checked 
these results with the CIA World Factbookxxxv
Some studies chose to include the newness of the country, such as Mitchell and 
McCormick’s.  They almost all found that it had little impact on human rights.  However, they 
all used a coding with only a two-point range, and set the date at 1944.  While this may be a 
useful date for the rest of the world, most African countries actually gained independence after 
1944.  In fact, only Liberia, Egypt, and Ethiopia would have been considered independent before 
1944, and two of these countries were never considered colonized in the first place.  I chose to 
include this variable, changing the coding.   
.  I coded the African countries with UK 
colonization as 1, with non-UK colonization as 2, and countries without any kind of colonization 
(Liberia and Ethiopia) as 3. 
I created a seven-point range starting with 2 and ending with 9.  Countries gaining 
independence before 1929 received a two, during the 1930’s received a 3, during the 1940’s 
received a 4, during the 1950’s received a 5, during the 1960’s received a 6, during the 1970’s 
received a 7, during the 1980’s received an 8, during the 1990’s received a 9.  I felt as if this 
would show more clearly a relationship between newness of state and human rights practices, if 
indeed there was one.  Like the colonization data, I also collected this data from the Oxford Atlas 
of the World and the CIA World Factbook. 
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Having determined these three other variables (democracy, colonization, and 
independence), I combined them with foreign aid and began my analysis.  I performed a multiple 
regression study with democracy, colonization, independence, and foreign aid as my explanatory 
variables and human rights as my dependent variable.  I then analyzed the results. 
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3.0  ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION 
3.1 ANALYSIS 
I ran the multiple regression and found that the output shows that democracy, colonization, 
foreign aid, and independence together explain about 46 percent of the variance in human rights 
for this sample of cases, with an adjusted R Square of .457 and an R of .680, indicating a 
moderately strong correlation between the four explanatory variables and human rights.  While 
this is not an incredibly strong model, time constraints prevented me from adding the number of 
variables most likely needed to form a more complete version, although should I have time in the 
future I fully intend to do so. 
Table 1. Model Summary Output 
Model Summary 
  
Model R 
R 
Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error 
of the Estimate 
1 .680a .462 .457 3.020 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Chinese Foreign Aid, UK or Other, 
Independence, Democracy 
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The Coefficients output shows that, within a model which takes into account how 
democratic a country is, how new a country is, and what kind of colonial past a country has, 
Chinese foreign aid does indeed have a negative impact on human rights.  The foreign aid 
variable had a t-value of -1.665, showing that there is a slight association and that it is negative.  
While this figure turned out to not be statistically significant (smaller than .05), it still shows that 
with this model in 90 percent of the cases in this study, Chinese foreign aid did have a slightly 
negative impact on human rights of African countries. 
Table 2. Coefficients Output 
Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Stan
dardized 
Coefficients 
t 
 
Sig. B 
  
Std. Error Beta 
  
(Constant) 
 
7.125 
 
.859  
 
8.291 
 
.000 
 
Democracy 
 
.757 
 
.050 
  
.577 
 
15.144 
 
.000 
            
UK or Other 
       
-1.096 
 
.227 
         
-.188 
  
-4.827 
 
.000 
  
Independence 
 
.285 
 
.106 
  
.101 
 
2.696 
 
.007 
    
Chinese Foreign 
Aid 
       
-2.398E-9 
 
.000 
        
-.061 
  
-1.665 
 
.097 
a. Dependent Variable: Combined Physical Integrity and Empowerment 
Score 
 
These results indicate that Chinese foreign aid does have a slight negative impact on 
human rights in Africa.  However, this should not be overstated.  While the relationship is clearly 
negative, and the t-value shows that the data indicates that Chinese foreign aid does have some 
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kind of impact, as opposed to no impact at all, it is not a very strong impact.  It is not as strong as 
the other variables in the model. 
3.1.1 Two Specific Cases 
After these results, I looked into two specific country cases and examined their data individually.  
Both cases provided ideas to improve this study.  The first case I looked into was Cameroon.  I 
found this case particularly interesting because while smaller amounts of Chinese aid appeared to 
have no effect on the human rights rating for this country, the larger amount in 2005 appears to 
move the human rights rating down to five.  This is only a movement of one point, but it is a 
movement none-the-less.  This raises the question of whether or not there is a difference between 
levels of aid and their relation to human rights.  While this data is clearly not enough to draw any 
conclusions from, it would be interesting to pursue this variable at a later date. 
Table 3. Cameroon Data, 1999-2007 
Country Year 
Human 
Rights Chinese Aid 
Cameroon          1999 6 0 
Cameroon          2000 6 3,700,000 
Cameroon          2001 6 4,200,000 
Cameroon          2002 6 0 
Cameroon          2003 6 0 
Cameroon          2004 6 0 
Cameroon          2005 5 189,907,000 
Cameroon          2006 6 3,000,000 
Cameroon          2007 6 4,900,000 
 
I ran a statistical regression on Cameroon’s Chinese foreign aid and human rights record.  
The results supported the model’s output, although this is more likely due to the huge difference 
between the 2005 value and the other aid values.  I looked into Cameroon’s background and 
found nothing outstanding that could impact these results during this study’s time span. 
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The case of Eritrea made me think of another possible variable.  The data clearly shows 
the fluctuations expected due to increased foreign aid.  It is important to note that this is with the 
three-year lag attached to the foreign aid data.  In 2002 Eritrea had a human rights rating of 5 and 
was getting no foreign aid from China.  In 2003, the aid value goes up to 1 million and the 
human rights rating goes down to 3.  Then aid levels drop back to zero and human rights returns 
to 6.  This pattern continues for the next three years as Eritrea receives over $8 million in aid and 
its human rights drops to 2. 
Table 4. Eritrea Data, 2002-2007 
Country Year 
Human 
Rights 
Chinese 
Aid 
Eritrea           2002 5 0 
Eritrea           2003 3 1,000,000 
Eritrea           2004 6 0 
Eritrea           2005 2 5,000,000 
Eritrea           2006 2 2,000,000 
Eritrea           2007 2 1,800,000 
 
The statistical regression on Eritrea’s Chinese foreign aid and human rights record supports my 
hypothesis and the model’s output as well with an R of .664 and an R Square of .441.  Its t-value 
was -2.510 and was considered statistically significant.  Another thing that should be considered 
when looking over this data, however, is that Eritrea has been in a border conflict with 
Ethiopia.xxxvi  
It is important to remember that these cases are only examples and that these regressions 
cannot prove or even indicate what the model does.  There are many flaws in looking at only 
individual country cases, the first of these being the smaller amount of available data for 
regressions.  The second of these is the inability to input these cases into the model, as the 
This could have had an impact on these statistics.  Internal and external conflict is 
another variable to look into for the future. 
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control variables are either the same or similar for each case.  For example, the independence 
index or colonization index would be exactly the same for each of Cameroon’s cases. 
3.2 CONCLUSION 
I found that Chinese foreign aid does have a negative impact on human rights in Africa, when 
democracy, newness of nation, and past colonial experience is accounted for.  However, this 
impact is only slight and was not statistically significant. These results are clearly not strong 
enough to support any actions for or against Chinese interests in Africa.  More research into this 
issue needs to be done and a more thorough model developed.  I would be particularly interested 
in seeing the impact of foreign aid on human rights when more variables are added to the model.   
 What would happen if I looked only at corrupt nations in Africa?  Would that strengthen 
the study?  What impact does internal and external conflict have on the human rights variable?  
The case of Eritrea could have been impacted by this variable.  What effect does equality (or lack 
there of) of wealth have on human rights?  If I added the GINI coefficient as a variable, would 
that create a more complete model?  Is there a certain foreign aid point at which it begins to 
impact human rights?  I hope to broaden this study in the future and attempt to answer some of 
these questions when I have more time and resources at my disposal to do so. 
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